Six Questions for Faculty: Professor Andrew Reddie on Iran-Israel Current Events
In the early hours of June 13, 2025, Israel launched a large-scale and coordinated military operation against Iran, reportedly targeting over 100 sites across the country. In the intervening hours, there have been a series of salvoes of drone and missile attacks involving the two countries.
To help put this crisis in context, we turned to Professor Andrew Reddie, Associate Research Professor at the Goldman School of Public Policy and founding director of the Berkeley Risk and Security Lab for the latest installment of GSPP’s Questions for Faculty. An expert on emerging military technologies, nuclear strategy, and international security, Professor Reddie brings a uniquely informed perspective on how conflicts like these unfold - and what it may mean for regional and global stability.
First of all, what are the current developments?
As you note, earlier this morning, Israel launched a series of strikes on Iran in light of long-held fears that Iran’s government is increasingly close to achieving nuclear breakout. These strikes included attacks on nuclear facilities—most notably at Natanz—as well as missile installations and the residences of senior military commanders and nuclear scientists. Codenamed “Operation Rising Lion,” the first round of strikes involved five waves of attacks, carried out by more than 200 aircraft and supported by covert operations likely involving Israeli intelligence services.
Following these attacks, Iranian state media confirmed the deaths of several high-ranking officials. Several prominent nuclear scientists were also reported killed. Initial casualty estimates indicate at least 78 people dead and over 300 injured, including civilians.
In retaliation, Iran launched a barrage of over one hundred drones and missiles toward Israeli territory. While many of these were reportedly intercepted by Israel’s missile defense systems, the situation prompted the closure of Israeli airspace as well as parts of Jordan and Iraq (following earlier decisions by the United States to withdraw embassy staff in the latter). Thus far, and despite the intensity of the strikes, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that there were no radiation leaks at key Iranian nuclear sites.
As you might expect, the international response has been swift. Oil and gold prices surged, stock markets reacted negatively, and global leaders issued urgent calls for de-escalation. The United Nations Security Council convened an emergency session, with Secretary-General António Guterres urging both sides to exercise maximum restraint.
At present, the full scope of the military and political consequences remains uncertain. While I’m sitting here in Washington DC, fears of broader regional escalation—potentially involving proxy actors, additional missile exchanges, or cyber operations—are high. And despite President Trump’s calls for Iran to engage in nuclear negotiations, diplomatic efforts to revive nuclear negotiations with Iran have likely suffered a serious setback.
Today marks the most significant direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran in decades, with far-reaching implications for regional security and the global nonproliferation regime.
Are drone and missile exchanges of this type between state actors now an accepted form of limited warfare, and what does this say about the future of escalation control in high-stakes rivalries?
From Ukraine to the Middle East, what we are seeing increasingly is the routinization of low-cost, high-visibility retaliatory strikes using drones and missiles—especially those with ambiguous origins (e.g., through proxies or plausible deniability). In theory, this enables states to signal resolve or retaliate without crossing into full-scale war, echoing what some call a “gray zone” conflict pattern.
However, the problem is that these forms of warfare are becoming harder to contain—made clear by the civilian casualties suffered in this episode. Indeed, the dangers of miscalculation or misperception are clear here. Iran clearly did not believe that Israel would launch an attack as it continued to pursue both nuclear enrichment and the delivery platforms to weaponize nuclear warheads. It is unclear the degree to which Israel believed a tangible response was possible (or likely) from Tehran, but even as I write this, there are images of successful Iranian missile attacks on Tel Aviv and explosions over Jerusalem in Israel.
The current exchange raises serious questions about whether doctrinal concepts like “proportionality” and “escalation ladders” still function in a meaningful way.
How does the current escalation between Israel and Iran reflect and reshape the regional security architecture in the Middle East?
The Israel-Iran conflict has long been a central axis of regional instability, but this overt military exchange marks a significant inflection point. It has long been feared that Iranian proliferation might yield a cascade of proliferation across the region—even as the relationships between states in the region (including Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and the new regime in Syria) are in flux. One might hope that there were clear off-ramps from the escalatory path that the two appear to be on at present, but it is difficult to imagine them.
For the United States, Washington is likely to be forced to clarify whether it actively supported Israel’s initial attack and whether it will support Israel in the event of a wider regional war, even as it seeks to prioritize competition with China and manage the war in Ukraine.
To what extent do attacks on nuclear infrastructure—whether covert or overt—undermine global nonproliferation norms and the legitimacy of the international nuclear order?
These developments strike at the heart of the nonproliferation regime—as Israel will claim that the existing order has failed to prevent Iran’s path toward the bomb, and Iran will claim that working inside of the nonproliferation regime has failed to protect them from attack.
Israel has long pursued a strategy of “preventive action”—as seen previously in Osirak, Iraq in 1981, and in Syria in 2007—but overt attacks on safeguarded or semi-safeguarded Iranian nuclear facilities, particularly if not coordinated with the IAEA, mark a change in posture.
Moreover, some argue that these attacks may create dangerous incentives: states may accelerate nuclear weapons development as a deterrent against similar strikes or choose to harden nuclear infrastructure in ways that complicate international inspections. This risks a cycle of proliferation and opacity at odds with the norms embedded in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA safeguards system that are already under pressure. The international community’s response—or lack thereof—will shape whether such actions become normalized.
How do great powers like the United States, China, and Russia calculate their responses to Israel-Iran escalation, and what constraints or opportunities does the conflict create for their broader strategic agendas?
Each great power faces a different calculus. For the United States, the priority is likely preventing a full-scale regional war (indeed, U.S. forces have noted their involvement in shooting down Iranian missiles headed for Israeli targets) that would require engagement at a moment when its resources and political bandwidth are already stretched. President Trump appears convinced that the strikes might bring Iran to the negotiating table, but it remains to be seen what the impact of the past few hours will have on the 40,000 or so troops that the United States has in the region.
China, as a growing economic partner to both Iran and Gulf states, is likely to posture as a mediator while using the crisis to present itself as an alternative to U.S.-led security frameworks. Beijing’s recent efforts to broker détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran may provide some diplomatic leverage for it to play this role.
Russia, meanwhile, may exploit the situation to further distract attention from Ukraine. Given its military partnership with Iran (especially in drone technology), it is unlikely to condemn Tehran. Moscow could use the moment to deepen defense-industrial ties with Iran or push for greater instability in energy markets to benefit it economically. Indeed, the surge in the price of oil benefits Moscow at the outset.
Should (or can) international institutions—such as the UN Security Council or the IAEA—still play a meaningful role in managing or mitigating this crisis?
Their capacity is under serious strain. The IAEA has been increasingly marginalized as diplomacy around Iran’s nuclear program has collapsed—especially following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and Iran’s subsequent breaches of enrichment limits. Indeed, the IAEA’s Board of Governors formally noted Iran’s breach of its nonproliferation obligations for the first time in 20 years only yesterday (June 12, 2025).
The UN Security Council, meanwhile, remains gridlocked, particularly with Russia and China unlikely to support punitive measures against Iran and the United States unlikely to support the same for Israel (with all three wielding a veto). In this environment, international institutions risk (and arguably already are) becoming forums for rhetorical contestation rather than meaningful crisis management.
That said, the longer-term legitimacy of the nuclear order may hinge on efforts to re-empower these institutions—especially if further strikes raise questions about sovereignty, civilian infrastructure, and the future of nuclear diplomacy.