Executive Summary

The "Democracy, Values, Governance and Free Speech" initiative seeks to develop emphases on Campus that would help Berkeley respond to the current, widely perceived global crisis of liberal democracy. As the world's greatest public university--and one with a distinguished history as a forum for free speech--Berkeley enjoys a special position as a leader in the academic response to this crisis of democracy. It is also an institution to which other schools will be looking for guidance. Our proposal is to create the institutional structures necessary for Berkeley to lead in this space.

Our SI proposes to place thinking about democracy at the center of Cal’s research and teaching agenda. A new Democracy Commons would be established to curate and host new types of interdisciplinary teaching on both the history, impacts, and dynamics of democracy. We advocate new teaching opportunities that would foster new dialogues around democratic practice and theory across the humanities, social sciences, arts, STEM and the professional schools. The next generation of Cal students would benefit from a set of courses--ranging from Freshman Seminars to senior "capstone" projects--that would focus on the structure and function of democracy. STEM scholars would be encouraged to think about the ethical and political implications of their work, as humanists would be stimulated to become cognizant with new developments in science and technology affecting democratic practice. Social science and professional students would have new opportunities to engage more broadly with communities, both in the Bay Area and internationally. At the research level, faculty would receive inducements to generate work touching on the theory, practice, and history of democracy. A new program of "Democracy Fellows" would bring scholars, activists, scholars-at-risk and public figures to campus to interact with faculty and students in new contexts.

Our proposal focuses on three large themes: "Reinventing Citizenship," envisions a newly dynamic conversation on the limits and possibilities of citizenship, both as it has traditionally been understood (in history, in art, in political theory), and as it is emerging today (digitally, globally, locally). "Democratic Speech Cultures" tackles the problems of freedom, disagreement and debate in a democratic society, proposing new spaces in which students and faculty can learn to disagree, agree, and explore the limits of argument. "Making Democracy Work" focuses on the ways in which new research and new technology can help refine and transform the practices and techniques of democratic governance.

This proposal speaks both to the pedagogical and the research dimension of the campus. It will help educate and prepare the next generation of California leaders in new ways, equipping them with the practical and historical knowledge needed to be engaged citizens going forward. And it will mobilize the unmatched research power of Berkeley to help create a reinvigorated democratic culture and practice in the United States and globally.
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A. Citizenship and Migration

1. What is the significant societal challenge that this solution/topic area will address?

Citizenship — whether understood as a legal status, a collection of political rights, a set of duties and mutual obligations, or some combination of these — is a mechanism for delimiting and putting heft into membership in a democratic society. But while it can be inclusive and emancipatory for those with citizenship, it has always been a double-edged sword, simultaneously excluding denizens and noncitizens. It is thus also a project of belonging and othering. In the present moment, citizenship as a concept and condition faces unprecedented challenges. The reconfiguration of social and political life in the digital age; the prevalence of mass migration; the expansion of mass incarceration in the United States and other countries; the rapid movement of capital beyond national borders; the splintering of political communities: all present forceful challenges to the concept and practice of citizenship, and demand attention to the ways democratic societies constitute their membership and advance freedom, equality and justice in the 21st century.

Historically and in the present day, citizenship has determined who belongs, who votes, and who gets to stay; it confers or restricts access to, and exclusion from, resources, benefits, and political participation. The historical record and contemporary world provide myriad examples of the gaps between different facets of citizenship. Globally, every current democracy has restricted suffrage at one time by some combination of gender, property ownership, religion, ethnoracial background, indigeneity, education or literacy, mental competency, criminal record, and age. Today, the challenge of migration, in particular, raises normative and substantive questions. Because citizenship entails access to a particular state, with attendant legal, political, economic and social institutions, people are assigned life chances via citizenship that some liken to feudalism, since citizenship is overwhelmingly determined by birth. When people move across borders, or wish to do so, can they access a new citizenship? Or should citizenship be abandoned entirely for an alternative set of human rights? Contemporary versions of citizenship restriction have led to analyses that expand the boundaries of citizenship, seeing it as cultural, flexible, everyday, and performative.

“Citizenship and Migration” is a bold, interdisciplinary initiative that will address these challenges directly, demanding response from all sectors of the university, in ways that bridge theory and practice. Citizenship - as a practice, as a contested status, and as an ideal - cuts across the conceptual terrain integral to humanistic and social sciences. Citizenship has historically been a zone of thick normativity, a site for the generation of moral values, political obligations, and affective solidarities. As such, it has been defined, negotiated, and challenged in philosophy, legal thought, literature, poetry, and more. Social scientists study access to citizenship, the consequence of noncitizenship, and the dynamics that change citizenship boundaries in the law and in the everyday lives of people. Examining citizenship broadly also offers potential bridges to the mathematical, physical and technological sciences. Technological advances that increase the possibility of surveillance - face recognition, biomarkers in identification documents - may restrict citizens’ freedoms, while communication across borders might advance freedom for citizens of nondemocratic regimes. As technological change outstrips our traditional practices of citizenship, questions of ethics and impact bring the conversation full-circle back to insights from humanistic and social science scholarship.
We thus confront significant questions about the meaning, values and practices of citizenship. How, when and under what conditions does citizenship actually matter? For whom and in what contexts? How and under what circumstances can citizenship live up to its democratic and inclusionary promise? When and how are noncitizens able to claim full membership? How can we respond to the needs of, for example, disabled community members who may be citizens but are inevitably marginalized? In an age where the place of the nation-state is being upended by technological and economic change of many kinds, how does the concept of citizenship need to evolve? If citizenship is to be created anew for the 21st century -- as a common ground of solidarity, community, mutual obligations and rights robust enough to encompass diverse populations -- it will require reflection on citizenship and the variety of ways it has been understood and inhabited over time in various societies across the globe. It will demand attention to the present of democratic citizenship, to its opportunities and limits, to its deficiencies and potencies, and to the many alternative ways of imagining belonging in a 21st century polity.

2. How does the Working Group propose that UC Berkeley address this challenge?

In its classrooms and in public spaces, Berkeley creates vibrant and diverse communities of inquiry that serve as laboratories for exploring and practicing debate and deliberation. It also has a deep research infrastructure dedicated to civic and political life, in the College of Letters and Sciences, in the schools of law, journalism, and public-policy, and in its many independent research units. We envision using the campus — both as a space of debate and deliberation, and as a research resource — to develop a multi-pronged response to the contemporary crisis of citizenship. As a public university, this will also involve building strong bridges between academia and society, ranging from engagement with governmental and nongovernmental institutions, nonprofits, other civil society actors and the media.

1) Citizenship: past, present, future. This focus would include innovative work on topics like: the history of citizenship in global cultures; the stories we tell about citizenship; the relationship between ethical and political community; religion and democratic citizenship; the challenges of social stratification to the ideals of political community; digital technology, citizenship, and contemporary political culture; migration and economic globalization as opportunities and challenges to democratic solidarity; alternative practices of citizenship; citizenship and authoritarianism; citizenship and the politics of social positioning; and citizenship as claims making.

Citizenship, in Western thought, is tightly tied with the history and practice of democracy. But to understand this relationship, and to help shape its prospects for the future, we also call for explicit consideration of citizenship in non-Western countries. Expanding research beyond Western nations raises the question of which citizenships matter and under what conditions, as well as the overlap between physical borders and membership boundaries around particular populations. Membership hierarchies from colonialism might remain, be re-ordered with independence, or be repudiated in the process of establishing sovereignty and self-determination. These hierarchies are often reimagined in the cultural sphere in ways that affect emerging collective imaginaries. There are also interesting questions about sub-national and semi-sovereign groups like indigenous peoples in various countries in the Americas. Furthermore, we need a much clearer vision of what people outside EuroAmerica think democracy is, the criticisms they tend to level at one-person, one-vote ideas, and how they think their own societies evolve
in more democratic directions by attending to bread-and-butter issues, or specifically local issues. Attention to these issues, as well as to the historical question of what democracy may have meant to earlier historical moments, can help us understand how and when citizen “matters” or doesn’t “matter” in society.

2) Citizenship, Local, National, Global: One of the key challenges to citizenship in the 21st century will be to make connections among the local, national, and global. An undergraduate education at Berkeley should prepare Cal students to respond to these challenges directly, whether by intensive engagement with the Bay Area and California, or via more extensive engagement with matters national and international. This could take many forms: Berkeley is already a pioneer in, for example, "citizen science," the effort to involve the wider community in the development of scientific knowledge. A curricular initiative that would allow undergraduates to develop citizen science projects would allow undergraduates to become creative advocates for Berkeley's strength in the natural sciences. The same could be developed for other areas of the university — "citizen literature," or "citizen social science," efforts to broaden the public of the public university, and allow students to carry their studies beyond personal self-transformation and into a wider world. This could include building on the strength of the American Cultures Program, and its Engaged Scholarship initiatives (ACES), as well as other community-learning/engaged scholarship initiatives.

If one half of this initiative would, as it were, bring the world to Berkeley, the other half would bring Berkeley to the world — citizenship is, as we have said, a global phenomenon, various in its articulations, traditions, and contexts. As part of an expansion of the undergraduate curriculum into an international arena, the citizenship initiative would put resources into the undergraduate international experience. The study abroad program is already a vital part of the undergraduate experience — we envision here, however, an intensification of an experience that can often be diffuse and superficial. By partnering with specific international organizations focused on issues of democratic life — NGOs, think tanks, university institutes, community organizations — we would aim to give a concentrated focus to the undergraduate international experience, a focus that could serve undergraduates both in their capacity as future professionals and as citizens and community members of the future. We would aim, in addition, to create links between this program and UCDC or Cal in Sacramento programs, which already afford undergraduates experience of this kind at the state and national level.

3) Democracy Fellows: This would be a global experiment in political life, with outposts in academia, government, nonprofits, social movement organizations, think tanks, and beyond. In a context in which there has been a convergence around the world of ethno-nationalist, authoritarian, and anti-democratic movements of all stripes, an initiative rooted in thinking through democracy, inclusion, and citizenship is all the more necessary. Berkeley has an opportunity to offer a comprehensive response to these threats to democracy, from an institution that has been a leader of democratization efforts inside and outside of university, and from an institution with a unique capacity for global engagement and outreach.

3. Why is UC Berkeley uniquely qualified to address this challenge?

Since its founding, Berkeley has been committed to the idea that a thriving democracy depends on an educated citizenry, a citizenry committed to common public goods, one that not only benefits individually
from these goods but also believes in extending these benefits as widely as possible across the polity. While the university is not without its own challenges around inclusion, the trend has been one of increasing inclusion and democratization. As America’s premier public institution of higher education, Berkeley has played and continues to play an outsized role in determining the nature of this democratic citizenship. It is more than just a research institution of international significance. Although it surely is this too, it also models and advances the ideal of a democratic, open society for the nation at large as well. It is an experiment in democratic education, one in which ideals of citizenship are debated, created, and extended into the society at large. Berkeley's important role, real and symbolic, as a public laboratory for experimenting with democratic life makes it, in short, unique among institutions of higher education for rethinking the future of citizenship in the 21st century.

No less important, Berkeley has a diversity in its campus community unmatched in any of its peer institutions and organizations. Berkeley students sit at the intersection of globalism and U.S. citizenship: two thirds of Berkeley undergraduates are first or second generation immigrants. A significant proportion are also international students. They demonstrate why, for citizenship to mean something in our contemporary world, it will have to be robust enough to compass the diversity and complexity American society at large, nested within a global community. With more foreign languages taught on the campus than virtually anywhere else, an extraordinarily diverse international community of students and researchers, and 40% of undergraduates reporting English as their second (or third) language, Berkeley can make global citizenship come into focus like few other places in the United States. This makes Berkeley again uniquely positioned to address both the history and the future of democratic citizenship in America and internationally. Berkeley has a unique role to play, moreover, in that it far exceeds many of its peer institutions in its commitment to non-EuroAmerica.

Berkeley also has a history of challenging and rethinking norms of democratic citizenship and community, memorably in the Free Speech movement, and in UCB’s tradition of engagement with programs such as the Peace Corps and Americorps, but also far beyond that, from its early admission of women into public education, to the outsize role it has played in recent violent clashes over the politics of identity, speech, diversity, and much more. These catalyzing public events are mirrored by the intense creativity of Berkeley faculty working on questions of citizenship and community. Its leadership in humanities and social science disciplines — philosophy, ethnic studies, classics, law, English, music, history, sociology, languages, political science, public policy, and more — provide unmatchable research resources for rethinking the past and present of citizenship.

Berkeley also occupies a unique place in the geography of contemporary citizenship. Insofar as technology has put common ideals of citizenship under enormous pressure, Berkeley's proximity to the very center of this technological revolution makes possible a serious dialogue between the major Silicon Valley innovators and our own significant resources in the humanities and the social sciences. Indeed, these dialogues already exist — the deep connection between Berkeley students and faculty, on the one hand, and Silicon Valley technology firms, on the other, will make possible the kind of creative and significant partnerships, an opportunities for productive disruption, accessible to virtually no other institution in the world.

B. Democratic Speech Cultures
1. What is the significant societal challenge that this solution/topic area will address?

Civic discourse has undergone a profound transformation in the past two decades. As legacy media outlets have struggled and declined, the internet has ushered in an era of virtually unlimited, cost-free speech. Individuals are now able to communicate with each other directly, in a way that is unmediated by cultural gatekeepers, and to interact with other individual speakers in real time about matters of topical significance. As consumers of speech, we now have access to a vast spectrum of viewpoints and opinions, and we can establish easy communities of interest with others who share our outlook and concerns.

But this era of transformation in civic discourse has coincided with a period of destabilization in democratic practice, particularly as it pertains to speech. There is less elite control of speech platforms, but there is also less trust in scientific and other authorities, and a corresponding increase in influential conspiracy theorizing, extremism, and outright propaganda and “fake news”. There is a wider spectrum of views easily accessible to the ordinary citizen, but also a decline in reasoned disagreement and debate across ideological divides, or even consensus about the facts on which political decisions need to be made. Political polarization appears to have increased, and voices of hatred and intolerance have been amplified. There are also widespread concerns that citizens inhabit “epistemic bubbles” that are hermetically sealed from contact with each other—paradoxically so, given the ease with which they can be exposed to disparate views online and via social media.

These developments are exacerbated by the increasing levels of economic inequality in our society, which have amplified the voice of the already affluent and powerful (especially in the United States, given the Supreme Court’s equation of money with political speech). And they find expression in exemplary subcommunities as well, such as the university, where fierce battles rage about ideological diversity, freedom of expression, toleration, and civic respect.

Taken together, these developments threaten to undermine our democratic institutions and to impede their capacity to address the serious social challenges that we collectively face. They call out for sustained reflection about what a healthy democratic speech culture might look like, and how it can be reinvigorated under contemporary conditions. We must draw on the traditions of our own language communities (both in the US and abroad), on the vocabularies that we inherit and deploy, and on the histories of debate, disagreement, negotiation, and representation that can guide further reflection.

2. How does the Working Group propose that UC Berkeley address this challenge?

The initiative aims to bundle the immense intellectual resources available at Berkeley to make the university the leading center for the study of democratic speech cultures, and to transform the campus into a laboratory for innovation in this area. Specific aims will be:

- To support *basic research* into the elements of democratic speech cultures, including innovative work on the following topics: the nature, value, and human significance of expressive activities; the historical development of practices of toleration and discursive exchange in pluralistic societies; the psychological mechanisms through which humans process and understand
information; the function of the press in democratic societies, under different historical and cultural conditions; the actual empirical effects of online speech regimes on contemporary social and political trends; and the different legal regimes through which rights to freedom of expression have been realized in democracies.

- To promote vigorous debate and disagreement within the framework of different disciplines, as ways of linking those disciplines to the current moment and discerning how our knowledge and training are shaped by the languages we use to shape research and learning—thereby replacing the current culture of outrage with a culture of reasoned disagreement.
- To support and foster interdisciplinary teaching about democratic speech cultures in all their dimensions, including both classroom instruction and research and discovery experiences.
- To support the campus’s role as an exemplary democratic speech culture, a community of vigorous discussion and debate that is open, but also fact-based, respectful, and inclusive. The Initiative aims to foster innovative practices at this level as well, cementing the university’s prominent place as the preeminent free speech campus in the United States, and a model for campus speech practices around the world.

3. Why is UC Berkeley uniquely qualified to address this challenge?

There are several factors that make Berkeley uniquely qualified to become a leader in this area:

- As the campus of the Free Speech Movement, Berkeley is already legendary as a site of activism and engagement around issues of democratic speech; this is in our DNA, and central to our public image. The central issue in the FSM was the right of members of our community to engage in political speech on campus. We should build on this important legacy to secure Berkeley’s standing as the preeminent center for research, teaching, and innovation about the acute and evolving challenges to democratic speech cultures in the contemporary world.
- Berkeley’s remarkable depth of research coverage across a range of relevant areas gives us the resources that are needed to make significant progress on these issues. Relevant strengths include those in the Arts and Humanities and the Social Sciences, which are important to understanding the foundational elements in democratic speech cultures, as well as in Law, Journalism, and Public Policy, which are crucial for analyzing and improving the institutional preconditions of flourishing speech practices. Equally important are the campus’ strengths in Data Science, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, and Information; these are crucial for transformational research into social media and online discourse, which have become the primary platforms for democratic speech today. (See, for example, Berkeley-student-founded Robhat Labs.)
- As the world’s most distinguished public university, Berkeley has a special responsibility to contribute to understanding the challenges that civic discourse faces in the contemporary world, and to developing innovative solutions. We are also geographically situated at the center of the tech industry whose platforms have transformed our speech practices. This adds to our responsibility to address these issues, and positions us to take advantage of local resources for thinking about the relevant challenges and developing and implementing effective solutions.
- Our remarkable and diverse student body is an additional resource that crucially distinguishes us from the other universities that might wish to contribute in this general area. One of the salient
challenges we face, as democratic societies, is to ensure that those who are not powerful and economically privileged have an effective voice in civic debates. To that end, it is important that students should be centrally involved in research and innovation on these questions who are not themselves children of privilege, and who represent a wide range of life experiences and backgrounds. Berkeley’s students will be a tremendous advantage in this initiative, one that our private peer universities cannot match. Berkeley is already celebrated for its contribution to the common good in the U.S. By training the next generation of students from all backgrounds (not to mention those from other countries) in a culture of democratic speech, the Campus will magnify its impact on the next generation of leaders, both locally and around the world.

C. Making Democracy Work

The twentieth century ended in broad euphoria as to the prospects for liberal democracy. The “wave” of democratization that began in the 1970s expanded into Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Recently, though, optimism as to the fate of democracy has become harder to sustain. While new technology has in many cases facilitated collective action, effective protest, and democratization, it has also been used to mislead the public, to spread falsehoods, and to interfere in elections. Even in the most established democracies, key democratic institutions are in crisis, prompting questions about whether democratic government is capable of addressing society’s most pressing problems. In the United States, gridlock and ineffective government have also contributed to an erosion of public trust in democratic institutions and to a gradual decline in political participation. Now more than ever, there is a powerful need to understand how to improve democratic governance and strengthen democratic practices. The future of democracy depends on it.

Democracy is in part defined by customs, cultural norms, and freedoms, but it is also defined by a broad set of institutions: rules and guidelines for how individuals participate, how representatives are chosen, and how those representatives make public policy on behalf of the public. But those rules and guidelines can take many forms, and the devil is in the details. As a general principle, democracy supposes large-scale citizen participation in the selection of policies or representatives, but precisely how that participation occurs is specified by an array of institutional choices ranging from how elections are conducted to the regulation of certain forms of participation (such as campaign finance rules). Democracy also envisages governing institutions that divide rather than concentrate power, embed checks and balances, and require pluralism and compromise in the design of public policy. But designing such systems is far from exact science, and governments around the world (countries, states, localities) opt for a wide-ranging assortment of such institutions. Debates about the advantages and disadvantages of particular democratic rules and practices are as old as democracy itself. Yet in recent years—as some democracies have slipped back into authoritarian practices; as many advanced democracies have struggled to adapt to demographic change, social pressures, and fiscal stress; and as the United States in particular has been mired in intense partisan divisions and gridlock—concerns about the future of democratic institutions and practices have reached a fever pitch.

This crisis in democratic institutions calls for bold, innovative research on how to make democracy work better, as well as increased engagement between scholars, practitioners, policymakers, and the public. We envision three areas of focus for such an effort. The first is authoritarian regimes and democratic
transitions, as there is a great deal to be learned about the economic and political forces that contribute to democratization and the risk factors for slipping back into authoritarian practices. The second focus is governing institutions and elections—a sustained effort to advance our understanding of how democratic institutions can be better designed to promote good governance, long-term problem-solving, and more equitable social outcomes. Third, this enterprise will focus on how to increase political participation and reduce inequality in participation, including through advances in technology, and on how to identify practices that may allow interest groups and powerful individuals to steer policy away from the public interest.

Authoritarianism
We can learn a lot about the challenges and limits of democracy by studying non-democratic regimes. Authoritarian regimes can be quite stable and, ironically, may win their stability by donning the trappings of democracy. Clever authoritarian leaders conduct elections, utilize the law and the courts, and allow or even encourage limited forms of citizen protest, self-governance, and civic deliberation. The paradox of contemporary authoritarian regimes is that they often use democratic institutions to increase their own stability. The strategies used to co-opt or subvert democratic institutions are manifold, and understanding them is essential for defending democracy. Authoritarian leaders may pack courts, revise constitutions, nationalize the press, gerrymander electoral districts, neutralize opposition leaders, engage in corruption, deftly use social media to manipulate public opinion and exercise nationalist rhetoric—all while upholding democracy in name.

Authoritarian regimes, however, may also evolve—gradually or abruptly—toward more robust democratic institutions and practices. Popular protest may lead to successful demands for democratic reform. Militaries may disobey authoritarian orders to shoot protesters. Courts, police forces, and the press may establish enough autonomy from powerful economic interests to use the law and investigative reporting to hold them accountable. Electoral systems dominated by a single political party may gradually give way to stable multi-party systems. Although the pathway from authoritarian to democratic rule is tenuous, all stable democracies have successfully traversed this path at some point in their histories. While this is nothing new, it is imperative to understand how twenty-first century social, economic, and political forces contribute to or constrain pathways to robust democracy.

Governance and Elections
Media accounts of democracies’ shortcomings and failures often emphasize the ill will of individual leaders, but very often electoral and governance structures have a profound influence on what elected officials do and do not do. Consider legislatures— institutions typically charged with adopting broad policies to address public problems. Legislatures are composed of many individuals, each of whom is typically elected from a relatively small district; is supported by a constituency with interests at odds with those elsewhere; and faces a complex set of electoral pressures including the need to raise money, the requirement that he or she be nominated and supported by a political party, and the necessity of winning the requisite votes in a general election. In crafting and voting on public policy, individual legislators weigh these various pressures, anticipating how their policy positions will affect them in their next election. So how do electoral and legislative rules affect legislators’ willingness to enact much-needed policies? In what ways does it matter how electoral districts are apportioned and drawn? How do party nomination processes affect the kinds of candidates who are nominated? When do electoral institutions
create incentives for legislators to make racialized appeals, to rely on fear-mongering and divisiveness, and to take extreme, uncompromising positions? Can these and other institutions be modified to encourage long-term rather than short-term thinking, to promote broad solutions rather than parochialism, and to create incentives for compromise and action rather than gridlock and finger-pointing?

Questions about how the “rules of the game” affect decision-making in democracies apply with equal force to executives, the courts, government agencies, and political parties—as well as to the intersection of these government institutions with each other and with the public. In the United States, for example, the two major political parties are as polarized as they have been at any point in their history, leading not only to hostility and conflict as they negotiate policy and contest elections, but also to a growing affective polarization of the broader citizenry. Combined with the American system of separation of powers and many non-majoritarian institutions, the general result has been gridlock, policy paralysis, and a shift to state and local governments—where it is still possible to get things done. An effort to improve democratic governance demands close inspection of the sources of such polarization, the study of its consequences for politics and policy, and an assessment of ways to overcome or adapt to it. It also requires a focus on how public policy gets made, what the impacts are, and the degree to which government institutions can be leveraged to address the big problems facing society today.

An effort to improve democracy also calls for attention to how elections—a cornerstone of democracy—are conducted and administered. In the United States and elsewhere, debates about who can vote, what identification they must provide to vote, and the methods by which they can vote (by mail, on the internet) are framed as debates about preventing fraud and encouraging participation, but they also have consequences for how many people vote, for the composition of the electorate, and potentially for who wins and who loses. Seemingly simple matters such as the number and visibility of polling places and the counting of ballots can potentially succumb to partisan fighting because they affect how many people vote and who votes. And with the rise of the internet and new technology, the potential for advances in voting, vote counting, and information dissemination is extensive, but so also is the potential for manipulation, hacking, and fraud. Research on the mechanics, design, and administration of elections—including the technology that is used—has tremendous potential to improve the operation and thus the substance of democracy.

Participation
Democracies typically support the principle of “one person, one vote,” but in practice, some citizens are much more engaged in democracy than others. Voter turnout in national elections varies dramatically across countries depending on a variety of cultural norms and rules, but in many longstanding democracies, a quarter to half of eligible citizens regularly decline to exercise their right to vote. Turnout in U.S. national elections is not only lower than in most comparable nations but has been on a slow and steady decline since the 1960s. There are also tremendous disparities in voting participation across groups, with white voters, older voters, more partisan voters, and voters with more education and higher income far more likely to participate. These patterns are even more pronounced in local elections than in national elections. Not only does low and unequal voting participation have effects on election outcomes and policy decisions, but policies themselves can serve to discourage or encourage participation by creating negative or positive interactions between citizens and their governments. Any effort to improve
democracy should have a focus on increasing voting participation and reducing disparities in participation across groups, for example through advances in technology or improvements in registration requirements.

Beyond these disparities in voter turnout, some individuals have other ways of participating in democracy that enhance their influence. Wealthy individuals and interest groups with intense policy views can often give large sums of money to candidates, political parties, or campaigns. Well-organized groups with large and geographically dispersed membership can mobilize their members to support a cause or to oppose a threat—giving them an edge over the unorganized. Businesses and other well-resourced groups devote considerable energy to lobbying elected officials to pass policies in their interests and to block those that would work against them. And oftentimes the groups with the most at stake positions on boards, commissions, and in government agencies that advise elected officials or sometimes even have decision-making authority. Thus, while there are large disparities in voting participation rates across groups, it is perhaps in these other forms of participation—giving money, lobbying—where the greatest inequalities in political participation lie. There is still a tremendous amount to learn about the extent to which powerful individuals and active interest groups engage in these activities and how it affects democracies’ decisions (and non-decisions) in areas like climate change, fiscal policy, social welfare policy, and criminal justice policy.

**Why is UC Berkeley uniquely qualified to address this challenge?**

The diversity and strength of Berkeley’s faculty and student body across the disciplines makes Berkeley the ideal place to pursue this type of work. We already have an incredibly strong core of faculty in the Political Science, Sociology, History, and Economics departments as well as the Schools of Public Policy, Law, and Business who are engaging in sophisticated research on some of these topics. STEM faculty are already working on platforms for shared decision-making and voter verification. Colleagues in the Humanities and Social Sciences work on the relationship between political and intellectual authority and publics. Even more than many of Berkeley’s competitors, units on the Berkeley campus have actively worked to span disciplinary divides that tend to reward technically sophisticated but substantively narrow work. Berkeley faculty across multiple disciplines pursue research that is substantively important and technically excellent—which is precisely what is needed to develop a deeper understanding of how to make democracy work better in the years to come. With sufficient resources to strengthen and expand what we are already doing, Berkeley would become a hub for informative research on how to improve democratic institutions and practices.

Berkeley also stands apart from, say, Stanford, Columbia, and MIT, precisely because this campus is already distinguished by its longstanding engagement in the “common good.” Because of our public status and mission, we are implicated in the workings of democracy in ways that our private competitors are not. We have skin in the game. Democracy’s future is our future. Moreover, Berkeley’s leadership in diversifying campus communities and empowering previously marginalized student groups make the campus itself a laboratory for thinking about democratic mechanisms. These traditions, coupled with the scholarly culture of patient research, make Berkeley a leader in what we might call “deep thinking” (as distinct from the “quick thinking” that pervades the policy/ideas landscape in DC and elsewhere). We already have in place institutional vehicles for this kind of work, from the Goldman School, to CITRIS, to the Social Science Matrix, to Arts + Design, to the Townsend Humanities Center.
D. Implementation

But the reality, for a research university like Berkeley, is that a robust majority of faculty who work in the human sciences, as we might define them, locate within traditional disciplinary departments and find themselves, as a result, subject to professional and institutional pressures that prioritize methodological rigor over practical application and elevate contributions to the academic discipline over service to the society. The cliché of an Ivory Tower detached from practical concerns is a distortion, but those of us who labor within its walls must concede that the metaphor is not without some basis in truth.

Connecting the university and its faculty to the problems of democratic societies thus warrants far-reaching reflection about the purposes of the university, reflection that is especially urgent for faculty working in the human sciences.

Berkeley already has strong institutional resources for tackling these threats to our democratic future. These include our academic departments, in the humanities and the social sciences, whose traditions of fundamental research and teaching will be essential to our understanding of the history and complexity of the challenges we face. They also include our organized research units and professional schools, whose excellence in the human sciences generally surpasses any public peer competitor.

No less important is Berkeley’s institutional history, grounded in its longstanding self-conception as the nation’s premier public university. Berkeley’s faculty and students have chosen Berkeley because it is a public university—often forsaking more lucrative opportunities in the private sector in order to do so. Worldliness and public mission are hardwired into Berkeley’s institutional genome—and can be relied upon to bolster a significant effort to renew Berkeley as the leading-edge model for the twenty-first century public university.

The Democracy Commons

Because traditional departments tend to be siloed in important ways, addressing the challenges we face require significant changes across Berkeley's institutional landscape. The development and defense of robust democratic norms and values, for example, is hardly the province of any one department, let alone division. It is a matter for the humanistic and historical sciences; it is equally the terrain of those social sciences that work hard to understand how these norms shape and strengthen communities; and it is just as importantly the terrain of the professional schools, whose policy-oriented pedagogy and research can bring these norms into fuller public expression. The challenge we face, in other words, is how to create the necessary infrastructures, connective tissues, and incentives to produce the collaborative research and pedagogy necessary to renew a democratic future.

We propose developing a “Democracy Commons” that will provide the institutional infrastructure necessary to realize our vision without creating yet another bureaucracy. Instead, the Commons will serve as a home for the various pieces of this initiative, creating a common space where participating faculty and visitors are able to meet, collaborate, and find support for their collective endeavors. We envision this
commons as a loose institutional structure that will provide a home for the teaching, research, and public service aspects of this endeavor. It will allow students and faculty with a central place to learn about our work, to engage as desired, and to find opportunities for collaboration. The commons will serve as a hub for the many entities -- departments, ORUs, centers, etc. -- that are already engaged in this important work. The staff assigned to the Democracy Commons will facilitate collaboration and provide support for public events, teaching innovation, and research projects. We imagine the Democracy Commons to be flexible and porous enough to be responsive to changing needs but robust enough to provide focus and organization to the initiative’s work.

Berkeley’s tradition of comprehensive excellence and its scale are two of its greatest strengths. They also, however, can make it difficult for students and faculty to be aware of and engage with all the cutting edge work that is happening across campus. We see the Democracy Commons as a way to tame that scale and provide the institutional structure necessary to foster and foment truly interdisciplinary engagement on this topic. In order to truly leverage Berkeley’s many strengths, we need to find new ways to engage across institutional boundaries. We believe the Commons to be just such a way. It will encompass the key programmatic pieces outlined below and will be flexible enough to be able to grow and shift as the initiative expands and deepens over time.

Below we delineate four institutional initiatives that will form part of the commons, understood to be a common and reinforcing institutional framework with tight integration with relevant departments and ORUs. This framework will guarantee the integrity, impact, durability, and coherence of the initiative at large.

This democratic renewal ought to begin, we believe, with a series of major investments that empower Berkeley’s research faculty in the human sciences to engage, in a spirit of adventurous application, with the fundamental dilemmas of modern democratic societies. To this end, we envision a series of landmark strategic investments aimed at the challenges in the spheres of both democratic values and democratic practice:

- in **Democracy Chairs** that will transcend current institutional silos and function as loci for both values- and practice-oriented intellectual engagement across the disciplines;
- in **Democracy Fellows** who will bridge the gap between the university and the worlds of practice, aiming to create productive collaborations around both normative and more concrete challenges to democratic life;
- in **Democracy Dissidents**, who will bring an important and threatened global community of scholars-at-risk that will enrich and expand Berkeley’s capacity to shape international affairs;
- and in **Democracy Scholars** who will constitute a new generation of policy-oriented academics, able to repair the gap that has opened between the human sciences and the problems of actual human societies.

**Democracy Chairs**

Berkeley’s engagement with the fate of democracy will center upon the creation of a new kind of endowed chair—a Democracy Chair. This initiative promises not only to empower Berkeley to recruit and promote world-leading scholars but also remake institutional incentives inside the university in order
to promote problem-oriented (rather than disciplinary, or even interdisciplinary) research and teaching in
the human sciences. These Chairs will nurture an ambitious quest for public application in the domains of
both democratic values and democratic practice.

Democracy Chairs would, as a matter of precondition, require:

- that the research and teaching agendas of chair holders align with one of the core strategic
initiatives on Democracy, Governance, and Speech.
- that chairs provide significant annual funds for the purposes of public application. This might
include policy-oriented research, the convention of dialogue between scholars and practitioners,
and so on. It might also include research and public programming aimed at the promotion of
democratic norms both in the university and the polity at large.
- that chair holders commit to teach on a regular basis a high-enrolling “marquee” course, such as
Robert Reich’s “Wealth and Poverty,” perhaps under the penumbra of the L&S Big Ideas course
initiative.
- that the selection of Democracy Chairs involve, at least in part, a group of faculty members drawn
from both disciplinary departments and professional schools and entrusted with an institutional
mandate to advance practice-oriented and/or values-oriented research and teaching in the human
sciences.

In sum, the Democracy Chair would bestow distinction and resources but would, in return, confer upon
the chair holder unusual expectations for both institutional service and intellectual application in the
human sciences. Defining the terms of an endowed chair in such terms would represent a novel and
significant initiative, with implications for American higher education model broadly. After all, endowed
chairs are customarily deployed, especially in the context of recruitment and retention, as unusual rewards
for unusual accomplishment, as assessed by peer academics within the chair holder’s field or subfield.

Creating a new category of Democracy Chair oriented towards application and carrying a significant
expectation of institutional and public service would represent a major innovation to the frameworks for
assessing performance and allocating rewards within the University. At least within the realm of the
human sciences, the Democracy Chairs would not only foster innovation within the human sciences but
also nudge university-based academics towards service and engagement. We expect that appointments
could be split between humanities and social science departments in the College of Letters and Sciences,
and the University’s professional schools.

There are few parallels for this kind of initiative. One point of comparison may be the fifty Bloomberg
Distinguished Professorships that Michael Bloomberg funded at Johns Hopkins, his alma mater, with a
landmark $350 million gift. Organized to transcend the predominance of disciplinary specialization inside
the American research university, Bloomberg Professors at Hopkins are required to be appointed across
multiple campus units. Quite self-conscious in its ambition and strategic vision, the Bloomberg initiative
aims to subvert—or at least restrain—the predominance of discipline in the very same university that did
so much to make the German model of disciplinary specialization the default mode of academic
organization for the modern North American research university.
Democracy Fellows

The Democracy Fellows Initiative would be an interdisciplinary and cross-campus program with the resources to invite the most innovative scholars, politicians, and activists to participate in a robust public forum and engage in collective labor in defense of a common democratic future. The initiative would create at Berkeley a common platform for discussion of democratic citizenship with participants from both inside and, as importantly, outside the academy. The initiative would, moreover, serve as an important haven for scholars-at-risk from around the world — the past decade has seen unprecedented threats to academics and activists across the world. By bringing these scholars to the Berkeley campus, we would not only provide them temporary haven, but also profit from their own rich expertise and international perspective on political challenges to global society at large. Other scholars-at-risk are long-standing residents of our community, such as undocumented students, those who hold precarious legal status or formerly incarcerated students. Through engagement with the Berkeley community and broader publics, we will generate unprecedented dialogues that we hope will move us through this current moment with more reflection, more optimism and less polarization.

Reorienting the university towards the normative and practical problems confronting contemporary democratic society requires not only nudging it towards fuller engagement with the public, but also developing new mechanisms for generating dialogue and meaningful collaboration between university-based researchers and a broad variety of practitioners who grapple with the challenges of democracy in the public arena.

A second major institutional initiative to transform Berkeley’s capacity for meaningful engagement with the problems of democratic societies will therefore involve the recruitment of a class of Democracy Fellows. These will be non-academics or at least non-traditional academics, drawn from a diverse array of backgrounds and professional milieu: the US and foreign governments; state and local agencies; international and non-governmental organizations; civil society, religious, and activist organizations, and so on. For Berkeley, these Democracy Fellows will function as human intermediaries, or bridges, capable of introducing the various normative and policy concerns of the public arena into academia and able to translate academic knowledge production for both non-academic and practitioner audiences.

In order to be effective, Democracy Fellows will need to be institutionalized into the research and teaching life of the university. To this end, it would be preferable for them to be housed in existing research and teaching units rather than cordoned into a special unit of some kind that might very well result in their isolation from the intellectual life of the campus. Some appropriate general guidelines might well include the expectations that:

- Democracy Fellows be appointed to the “Professors of Practice” series. This standing will confer upon the Democracy Fellows the prerogative to offer classroom instruction.
- Democracy Fellows be required, without exception, to engage in significant classroom instruction, preferably via classes co-taught with a member of the regular research (i.e., ladder) faculty. We envision courses capable of combining the perspectives of academics and practitioners as a highly promising addition to the Berkeley undergraduate curriculum.
- Democracy Fellows be empowered, including via the provision of resources, to encourage meaningful interaction between campus-based academics and the needs and concerns of
practitioners. These might include, for example, policy conferences (or “convening”) devoted to purposes ranging from the technical (i.e. the uses of machine learning in the struggle against voter suppression), to the historical (representations of democratic experience in art or literature), to the grand strategic (i.e. the uses and limitations of federal power in the management of anthropogenic climate change.) They might also include conferences or other public events aimed at exploring the various and competing normative foundations of democratic life. These examples are drawn at random; the variety is plausibly endless. The crucial point is that Democracy Fellows will have a vital institutional role to perform as orchestrators of dialogue between the university and its publics.

- Democracy Fellows be appointed as a result of consultation across diverse stakeholders, representing multiple campus units and disciplinary traditions. We can envision an internal application process that would permit campus units either (i) to recruit a targeted individual as Democracy Fellow, where an opportunity for such recruitment presents itself; or (ii) to run an open search for a Democracy Fellow in a particular topical and/or research area. In all cases, though, the appointment of Democracy Fellows should be overseen by an institution representing diverse stakeholders, in order to ensure that the Democracy Fellows serves a coherent strategic agenda for Berkeley.

**Democracy Dissidents**

The challenges to contemporary democratic society extend well beyond the borders of the United States. Three generations ago, Berkeley served as an open and inviting harbor for many scholars threatened by authoritarianism in all of its different forms. The past decade has seen a new and dramatic rise in the fortunes of international authoritarianism, and, in conjunction, a massive displacement of scholars whose integrity and scholarship puts their livelihood and lives at the most serious risk. Poland, Hungary, Turkey, Brazil, Egypt, Venezuela, China: the threat to academic freedom is a global one. This is both a disaster and an opportunity. By investing in a robust scholars-at-risk program — what we are calling the Democracy Dissidents — Berkeley will not only provide refuge, but also augment its capacity to become an international leader for a democratic future. Almost by necessity, these Democratic Dissidents will embody the two wider emphases of the initiative, on the centrality of democratic norms and practices in the maintenance of a democratic polity.

Our vision of this program follows, approximately, that of the “Democracy Fellows,” albeit with flexibility depending on circumstance and funding. For example, we envision:

- Democracy Dissidents be appointed as “Visiting Professors of the Practice.” This standing will confer upon the Democracy Fellows the prerogative to offer classroom instruction.
- Democracy Dissidents be required, without exception, to engage in significant classroom instruction, preferably via classes co-taught with a member of the regular research (i.e ladder) faculty. We envision courses capable of combining the perspectives of international and local academics as a highly promising addition to the Berkeley undergraduate curriculum. This will, finally, serve to importantly integrate the invitees into the intellectual at Berkeley.
● These “top level” appointments could (and probably should) be accompanied by a more flexible program sustaining shorter term visitors, e.g., those scholars needing emergency placement or short-term assistance toward eventual resettlement elsewhere.
● As with the Democracy Fellows, the invitation of Democracy Dissidents should be overseen by a committee representing diverse stakeholders—including potentially departments, ORUs, and campus deans—in order to ensure that the Democracy Fellows serves a coherent strategic agenda for Berkeley.

**Democracy Scholars**

The Democracy Chairs and Fellows initiatives are intended to expand and enhance the university’s personnel resources with rapid and dramatic effect. The Democracy Scholars concept, on the other hand, is better understood as a long-term investment intended to reorient the next generation of academics toward problem-based and practice-oriented research in the human sciences.

With some exceptions, the social sciences and humanities are today beset by a fundamental dilemma of self-replication. Crudely, even topflight academic departments train more graduate students than those departments are capable of placing in academic jobs, resulting in the overproduction of PhDs whose skills and training are oriented towards unavailable academic employment. (Economics is an exception, from which the other disciplines might learn.)

The creation of a Democracy Scholars initiative would strive to realize an alternative possibility: that training in the human sciences be reimagined as a pathway to a broad range of professional opportunities, across a variety of professional domains than an influx of trained social scientists and humanists might plausibly enrich.

To this end, we envision the creation of fellowship funds, tethered to the three major strategic initiatives that we have identified: citizenship and migration; making democracy work; and democratic speech cultures. A Democracy Scholars initiative would aim to recruit and support graduate students across the social sciences and humanities who envision making significant contributions to each of these strategic purposes in their academic and professional work. One particular need that the initiative might address is the recruitment of international graduate students, which the University of California’s graduate funding model presently inhibits. Their presence will contribute to making Berkeley a more cosmopolitan intellectual community, something that will both benefit students from California, and also provide valuable international perspectives on the global challenges that democracy faces in the contemporary world.

To be successful, an effective Democracy Scholars initiative will need to do more than simply provide fellowship support. We also envision the kinds of innovation in our graduate teaching that will empower students to engage in their graduate research and subsequent professional careers with the problems of a democratic society. Varieties of initiative that might support this end could include:
● graduate teaching intended to equip graduate students with the skill set necessary to function in practice-oriented debate beyond their home disciplines. A core graduate curriculum—for example—could familiarize graduate students with “ways of knowing” across the disciplines. We
cannot expect every Sociologist to become an Anthropologist and every scholar of Literature to master graduate Economics. But we might give serious consideration to whether our graduate curriculum could be retooled so as to empower graduate students to become at least informed consumers of academic knowledge produced in other disciplines.

- the institutionalization of collaboration between the professional schools and the core disciplinary departments to support graduate students who seek to pursue varieties of practice careers. The joint PhD program in Public Policy and Social Sciences (initially Economics, History, Political Science, and Sociology) that Amy Lerman and Daniel Sargent are developing for GSPP and the Division of Social Sciences is one example of the kind of concrete institutional initiative that might flourish under the penumbra of a Democracy Scholars Initiative.

**Pedagogical Implementations**

Berkeley educates the next generation of leaders in California and around the world. We cannot invigorate and realize democracy for the next generation without developing new approaches to teaching. None of this means anything unless we teach differently. And that requires inducements and adjustments. Currently, administrative roadblocks, disciplinary silos, and the weight of austerity (which especially hobbles small units) all discourage faculty from moving beyond familiar territory and teaching in new and innovative ways. Incentives are thus needed to enable faculty to turn their attention to democratic themes in the classroom. We propose the following innovations, from the Freshman level through graduate student work. As will be obvious, some of these involve little or no Campus investment. Others will require significant outlay of funds. All are important.

Teaching innovation within the curriculum.

- Course offerings within the Democracy Fellows program that would involve classroom collaboration between a visitor and a Berkeley faculty member. These could unfold within the “Democracy Commons” as cross-listed courses taught on the model of the “Big Ideas” courses or the new Arts and Humanities “Compass Courses.” They could satisfy breadth requirements in L & S (for example, Philosophy and Values, Historical Studies, or International Studies).

- A series of one-credit seminars for Freshmen and Sophomores on Democracy and the Media, touching not only on media literacy but on the role of new media technology in the generation of news and information (in collaboration with the Journalism School).

- Interdisciplinary Upper Division Seminars on topics directly relating to any of the three themes articulated in this SI. Funding should be secured to allow buyouts for teachers who wish to develop these courses (the Townsend Center’s successful, Mellon-Funded “Art of Writing” provides a possible model). Here important teaching would be pursued on the histories and traditions of democratic thought, on the mechanisms of democracy, and on the current crisis. Here we might imagine courses on comparative histories of democratic thought (Scandinavia, the U.S.), we might find the Spanish
Department working on early democratic experiments in California, the Classics Department teaching the history of classical democracy, courses on democracy and the novel in English, or linguistic translation of different democratic vocabularies, or the intersection between STEM work on the internet and Philosophy’s interest in the ethics of the internet, or Art History’s interest in visual culture. This, perhaps of all of the suggestions, has the greatest potential to transform both the student experience and faculty culture.

- Course threads on Democracy Studies and on Migration Studies (on the model of L & S Mellon-Funded Course Threads, which have been successful). Existing courses can be mobilized (assuming that administrative roadblocks can be removed).

- Campus Study Abroad and Study Away options would benefit from an interface with the Democracy SI. Without an international component, any talk about Democracy will be parochial.

- Expansion of summer teaching opportunities for democracy seminars within Summer Sessions, both practical work (internships, NGOs) and scholarly work (study in Brussels, for example, or work on the history of the Indian Democratic system).

- Expansion and development of Engaged Scholarship. Funding for programs in the community that take Berkeley students into democratic and governance organizations in the Bay Area and statewide.

- A Senior Thesis scheme to encourage capstone work on Democracy. Funding for a program that would bring democracy-themed thesis writers across campus into dialogue through meetings and a capstone day, on which work would be shared. Small funding grants for thesis writers. This would generate a cross-disciplinary community of seniors interested in Democracy themes.

- Expanded support for doctoral level research seminars bringing together faculty and graduate students working across disciplines on Democratic themes. Campus has models for work of this time (Institute of International Studies, Berkeley Language Center, Townsend Center). Buyouts for faculty would be needed.

It is impractical to assume that faculty will shift their teaching and research priorities to include democracy unless inducements are provided in the form of buyouts and research funds.

**Democracy and Technology**

Student discovery experience:

- Funds could be allocated for paid Public Interest Technology internships with advocacy organizations or policy think tanks. Interns could help to improve databases, web design, social media campaigns, etc. while learning about the inner workings of democratic institutions.
• Students could apply for research funds to develop software for civic engagement. Possible applications could be web browser extensions to detect unsubstantiated claims on contentious issues, platforms for gathering public opinion on policy questions, and bot detection (like this example from Indiana University).
• Students could work with practitioners to develop new databases or work with APIs to create new data visualizations on policy questions, voting trends, election financing, gerrymandering, or other democracy-related topics. Funds could be allocated to student clubs working on these topics or administered through organizations (like CITRIS Tech for Social Good, D Lab, or Big Ideas).

Research:
• A funder could establish a seed grant program that requires faculty from both CS/Engineering and a humanities or social science discipline to create a joint research project. Selected projects would also collaborate with a community organization to test pilot ideas and prototypes.
• Funds could also support research into new technology for democratic applications (here envisioning collaboration between STEM and Social Sciences or professional schools): How secure could online voting become? How might technology be used to test ideas of liquid democracy or delegative democracy? What implications might new technologies like distributed ledger technology (blockchain) have for democratic practice? What is the magnitude of the impact of online disinformation and propaganda campaigns by authoritarian states? What are the specific economic incentives that drive for-profit creators of online misinformation, and how can these incentives be curtailed through public policy?

Community projects:
• Faculty or students could work with historical sites or museums to create new applications in augmented/virtual reality that would enrich a visitor’s experience in a site or replicate the experience of being there (collaboration between, say, STEM and Architecture, Media Studies, or History of Art). The applications would be grounded in historical documents, oral histories, photos/videos, other testimony.
• Faculty and students could create non-partisan videos, websites, or social media posts to educate the public or legislators on various issues. For example, these might include a tutorial on avoiding online misinformation.
• Faculty and students could create and hold in-person workshops designed to educate legislators, judges, and other government officials on important topics related to technology and democracy. These might include explanations of dangers posed by various electronic voting schemes, the mechanisms and magnitude of gerrymandering algorithms, etc.

For all these suggested topics, funds would need to be allocated for faculty or program staff, student support, hardware/software/data storage.

**Expected Impact**
This initiative will have impacts both at Berkeley and beyond. On a pragmatic level, it will initiate curricular offerings to our undergraduates that will uniquely deepen and enrich their university experience, by investing in the research experience, connecting classroom to world, and facilitating
transformative democratic engagement with a global community. It will connect units from across the campus — the humanities, the social sciences, technology and engineering, and the professional schools — in ways that will benefit the advancement of faculty research. It will augment Berkeley's already substantial impact on local and regional communities, and advance Berkeley's mission to serve the people of the state of California. And it will help sustain and defend scholars at risk from around the world. On a conceptual level, it promises to renew and reorient our contemporary understanding of citizenship, to be part of a process of its renewal in the face of our fast-changing and ever-contentious social and political worlds.

Our ability to address and engage these questions effectively at Berkeley, given the diversity of our student population, will provide a model for how to construct a citizenship practice that is inclusive and just, and allows participants to achieve their full potential. The Campus is an ongoing experiment in communities in dialogue—both in everyday life and in terms of intellectual cross-pollination—and the tradition of outreach and engaged scholarship practiced here means that we will make a major impact for the next generation of Californians—and for students and researchers around the world. The impact in five years will be to provide a much better understanding of both the challenges and the opportunities that contemporary speech practices present to civic discourse. In ten years, there will be concrete proposals for more effective and inclusive democratic speech practices, which will lead to discernible improvements in the quality of disagreement and political debate online, as well as in the public forum.

In this same period the campus will have cemented and enhanced its standing as the leading university for democratic speech practices, becoming a prominent counter to the current moral panic about free speech on the American campus. We will also educate students who have a more sophisticated understanding of the theory and practice of democratic speech, and who have become more effective citizens of the democracies they inhabit—and will strengthen—through their experiences both inside and outside the Berkeley classroom.

But the Initiative is not merely directed to shorter-term solutions. The challenges to democratic speech cultures can be expected to evolve as the technologies and social practices that sustain civic discourse continue the ongoing process of rapid transformation. The foundational research and teaching fostered by the initiative will position Berkeley to serve as an important national and international resource for thinking about and meeting new threats and challenges to healthy civic discourse as they arise, and for nurturing constructive and effective democratic speech cultures under constantly changing conditions.